hegel something other

Prompt

Determinate being (Dasein) has proceeded from becoming; within becoming, being and nothing were the process of vanishing into one another. As thus having vanished into one another, their very distinguishedness resolved itself and hence becoming collapsed within itself as the simple unity of being and nothing: Dasein. 'Simple', an initially ambiguous term, means nothing more than self-equal. We should understand Dasein [in general] as the unity of being and nothing in the form of self-equality; they mutually contain one another as a simple oneness, without any disjunction or restless yet introduced to it. Similarly with the term 'simple', one will initially feel perplexed by Hegel's description of Dasein as 'the immediate unity of being and nothing' or the unity 'in the form of being'. This is simply because they do not yet know the interconnections of the words: being, immediacy, and simplicity, within Hegel's thought. All of these are essentially flavors of 'self-equality' used for different emphasizes. This is the reason why the category of being reappears wherever a contradiction resolves itself, for the result of such a resolution is that the negation is converted into the self-relation of one notion, wherein it is identical with itself through this very relation. That is to say, the resolution of a contradiction results in a higher, more concrete, being. Indeed, 'unity' is itself a term of form of being/immediacy for Hegel. Regardless, this is not yet a necessary fact to know, but is only useful inasmuch as one wants a more detailed understanding of the difference between Dasein in General and later categories such as quality. Quality will show itself to be the self-contradiction of Dasein in General; rather than this unity in the form of being, quality is this unity in the form of duality, self-negation, mediation, determinateness and so forth. This is why Hegel refers to Dasein in General as one-sidedly in the form of being/simplicity; we will come back to this later when we discuss quality more. The most important point we must consider in Dasein in General is that of 'determinateness'. This is a very often misunderstood point given Hegel's unfortunately short presentation of it in the Science of Logic, but the Lectures and Encyclopedia define it with immense and perfect clarity. First of all, recall that in Dasein being and nothing are contextualized as simply one and thus as mutually containing one another. We should thus no longer understand them as abstractions, as pure being and pure nothing, but instead in light of their identity with one another. Nothingness, which is absence or pure negation, is posited as being and being, equally, is posited under nothingness, negation. Being is posited as negated within nothingness itself; nothingness is that in which being is negated, or again, is the negation of being. Because of this special referentiality which absence, nothingness, now possesses, Hegel will go on to provide another name for it: determinateness. Technically speaking, we should not understand this as the origin of the relation of nothingness, as negation, to being. These were, in fact, already implicitly related as pure being and pure nothing; pure absence is the annulment of pure presence. More explicitly within becoming wherein nothingness took on the significance of non-being (nichts transformed into nicht-sein): "being and its negation said in one" as Hegel says. However, this is all a level of hairsplitting detail that is not relevant to us; the treatment of determinateness itself is wholly sufficient. What we have is absence posited as identical with being; a negation is simply the absence of its particular content. One could ask why it is the case that Hegel updates the term for nothingness but not for being. The reason is, in fact, quite simple. Being is mere immediacy itself, the unrelated and self-identical. Nothingness, absence, on the other hand, is a term of referentiality, of mediation. The updating of terms pertaining to nothingness is simply done in order to track the proximity and explicitness of its referential function. The manner in which it bares relation to being takes a great leap when it enters into simple unity with it, for determinateness is settled with being, with that which it negates, and is precisely the definiteness, the determinacy, of it. We previously called Dasein the simple unity of being and nothing, but it would equally therefore be permissible to say that it is the simple unity of being and non-being, or of being and determinateness. Dasein means nothing else than being that is settled with a determinateness, with its own negation that defines or delimits it; dasein is simply another name for determinate being. Now, determinacy is referred negatively to being, distinguished from it; however, being and determinateness are still submerged within their simple unity. This distinction is thoroughly sublated within it and has not yet taken the form of a disjunction proper; it is only a relationship internal to this simple unity itself. So much for Dasein in General! Before I go into detail into the quality, I should note that quality is a concept that undergoes development over the course of this section, and so one must pay careful attention to the subtle distinctions involved in order to grasp all the ways in which this term is used. I will attempt to clarify this and to show the connections. Beginning from Dasein in General, we have the proposition that being and determinateness are simply identical and mutually contain one another. Yet, this is a unity of distinct moments; being and determinacy are not dissolved by this unity, rather, each holds fast to its identity as now equally posited as the other. Accordingly, each moment, as nonetheless as distinguished moment, has the status as itself being this very unity with the other. Firstly, we are to grasp from this the side of being (the priority of this moment is necessary as I will discuss later). The result of this is the unity of being and determinateness grasped as being, or again, under the form of the moment of being. This is the same as saying determinateness that is, or immediate determinateness, accenting the moment of being. Hegel calls this unity quality as such; the word choice is irrelevant for our present consideration and will be explained later on. Quality as such emphasizes this moment of being; yet, it no less contains the moment of determinateness or non-being within it. We are therefore equally, and for the same reason, to posit this unity of being and determinateness under the form of determinateness. This unity is called negation. Because negation is this unity as non-being, it bares reference, negative reference, to the moment of being of this unity: quality as such. That is to say, negation is essentially a relation, namely, the negation of quality as such. Negation negates, and it consists solely in doing so. Quality as such is therefore related to by negation, is mediated, determined. Because of this opposition in which quality as such now appears, as negated, we will hereby call it reality. No forward step is made by this mere updating of the name, but grasping the definition of the term 'reality' is nevertheless important because it will later be used in systematic interconnection with other terms: the ideal in contrast to the real, ideality to reality, idealization to realization, etc. However, we will save a discussion of this for another time as it would be too large of a digression for our purposes. Before continuing on, we may clarify some points regarding what has so far transpired. Firstly, we should note the inseparability of reality and negation; each of these terms is simply a form or accent of determinate being in general. Determinate being entails the simple identity of being and determinateness, and, accordingly, that each distinct moment has the status of the whole unity. These two terms thus mutually contain one another, concealing the other within itself. Reality is itself determinate being, holding the moment of determinateness, of negation with it. On the contrary, negation is equally determinate being and therefore contains reality; the very being of negation is, indeed, posited as the whole and so is reality. To attempt to abstract reality from negation nor negation from reality is therefore a violent and false act. Reality is, indeed, a determinate being, not mere being, and therefore consists in having negation within it. The same applies to negation, which is not a mere nothing but is itself a determinate being, in connection with reality. Furthermore, we can note that negation is the very same determinateness that is within reality. Accordingly, although negation is this determinateness taken as opposed to reality, the determinateness still retains the status of being. Originally, we defined quality as simply determinateness which is; this was what we now call reality, but negation is no less a quality since is it still determinateness which is. Moreover, we should note that quality must firstly be taken in the affirmative sense; quality as such must be logically prior to negation. Hegel's derivation of negation coming secondly is no accident. The reason for the necessity of this is quite simple: as negation is precisely only as relation to reality, as the negation of quality as such, then quality as such must already be there in order for negation to come about. We cannot grasp negation without reality precisely because it is the reference to it. Reality, on the other hand, is the immediate term which, for that reason, can initially be derived by abstractly. Finally, as quality is no longer mere quality as such, but is equally itself negation as well, we should no longer understand it solely as a single category but equally as being its own sphere. The moments of quality, reality and negation, are the two sides of determinate being in general, being and determinateness. Reality and negation have essentially this unity, determinate being, as their basis. Each is only a moment of this unity which is given the status of equally being the whole unity and, as we have said, they for this reason conceal one another. Yet, they are equally placed into an opposition as negation is the negation of reality. The unity of determinate being has therefore became inwardly contradictory in quality, for the very moments which are posited as simply one by it have entered into an extreme opposition. Quality, as a sphere, is in truth a contradiction, or again, is nothing but the self-contradiction of determinate being in general. In comparison to this current stage we call quality, determinate being was at first this unity of being and nothing in the form of simple self-equality, the 'one-sided form of being'. However, quality is this unity in the form of opposition, division, which as a negative relation we identify with determinateness. Quality demonstrates the one-sidedness of Dasein in General as a simply self-equal unity. "Whether reality and negation are understood as different qualities or different moments of all quality, the difference between them falls within determinate being. It is a difference internal to the only way of being determinate there is. Consequently, it is one in which determinate being differs from, and relates to, nothing but itself. Recognizing this marks an important turning point in the unfolding of determinate being: for it now becomes apparent that determinate being is in truth inwardly differentiated, self-relating determinacy. This is a new dimension to determinate being that we have not encountered before. We saw earlier that determinate being is quality and that quality differentiates itself logically into reality and negation. What we have now learned is that reality and negation themselves prove to be moments or modes of self-relating quality.\n\nHegel is not claiming that determinate being simply reverts at this point to its original undifferentiated condition. He is arguing that it acquires a new logical identity that comes from having first been differentiated into two distinct qualities. Determinate being is self-relating determinacy only because it contains an internal difference between itself as real and itself as negative, and it contains this internal difference only because there is first—logically, not temporally—a qualitative difference between reality and negation that then undermines, or “sublates,” itself and in so doing reconstitutes determinate being as a single, simple quality that is equally real and negative.", "When we now ask about the distinction between the something and the other, it is evident that both are the same, an identity that is expressed in Latin by the designation of both as aliud – aliud. The other opposed to the something is itself a something, and accordingly we say ‘something else’ [etwas Anderes: lit. ‘something other’]. So, too, the first something is in turn itself an other vis-à-vis the other that is likewise determined as a something. When we say ‘something else’, we at first imagine that the something, taken by itself, is only something and the determination of being an other accrues to it on account of an external consideration alone." "This sublating of the distinction is more than the mere retraction and external re-omission of it, or a simple return to the simple beginning, to existence as such. The distinction cannot be left out, for it is. Therefore, what de facto is at hand is this: existence in general, distinction in it, and the sublation of this distinction; the existence, not void of distinctions as at the beginning, but as again self-equal through the sublation of the distinction; the simplicity of existence mediated through this sublation. This state of sublation of the distinction is existence's own determinateness; existence is thus being-within-itself; it is existent, something.", You're a Hegelian expert, master of The Science of Logic. Describe how Other is immanently derived from Something?